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Gig-economy platforms such as Uber and Lyft rely on their drivers as 
the backbone of their ride-sharing operations. These drivers, typically 
classified as independent contractors, are in a state of regulatory flux 
regarding their worker classification. Due to the novelty of the worker-
employee relationship in gig-economy platforms, these drivers exist in a 
regulatory gray area. California, with its very recent (and very controversial) 
Assembly Bill 5, has changed its operative worker-classification formulation 
to the worker-friendly “ABC” test in an attempt to statutorily modernize the 
burgeoning industry. In addition to analyzing the range of tests and their 
effect on the gig industry, this note will examine both the potential for the 
addition of a third “hybrid” worker classification category and California’s 
judicial evolution from the common law “Right to Control” test to the 




Uber and Lyft are app-based transportation platforms that allow 
smartphone users to connect to and travel with nearby drivers.1 Rather than 
paying the driver after the trip is completed, riders store their credit card 
information on the app, and their credit card is immediately charged once the 
ride is completed.2 Riders are offered an upfront price, consisting of a base 
 
 Kai Thordarson a third-year student, focusing on labor and employment law. He works at a 
small plaintiff-side personal injury and bad faith insurance firm.  Kai has served on the 
Hastings Business Law Journal since his second year of law school. In his free time, Kai likes 
to travel (when travel advisories are not in place). 
 1. How Lyft Works, https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/how-does-lyft-work/ (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2020); What is Uber? https://help.uber.com/driving-and-delivering/article/what-is-
uber?nodeId=eac2e43e-af42-4521-a042-2982c18664af  (last visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
 2. See A guide for how to use Uber, https://www.uber.com/us/en/ride/how-it-works/ 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2020); How Lyft Works, https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/how-does-lyft-
work/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2020). 
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charge and a cost per mile and cost per minute.3 Both platforms have 
algorithms that increase prices when the demand for drivers exceeds the 
number of available drivers on the road.4 Uber and Lyft take roughly 22 and 
27 percent of the total trip fare, respectively, and the rest is distributed to the 
driver.5  
Before they can start accepting trip requests, Uber and Lyft drivers must 
apply and be approved online.6 Uber and Lyft Drivers receive approximately 
70% of the fares paid by passengers.7 Drivers are drawn to ride-sharing 
platforms primarily because of their flexibility: drivers use their own cars, 
choose their own hours and territory, and need not wear a uniform.8 Both 
Uber and Lyft accentuate the freedom that their platform provides, boasting 
that drivers are given the opportunity to “be their own boss.”9 Furthermore, 
the barriers to entry are low: UberX drivers are required to merely (1) 
maintain a valid driver’s license and have proof of insurance, (2) have at 
least one year of driving experience in the United States, (3) meet the 
minimum age to drive in the city, and (4) use an eligible four-door vehicle.10 
Uber has even abandoned its requirement that drivers accept at least eighty 
percent of their trip requests to maintain employment.11 Owingin part to the 
flexibility and accessibility of the program, most Uber drivers have either a 
 
 3. How are fares calculated?, https://help.uber.com/riders/article/how-are-fares-calcul 
ated/?nodeId=d2d43bbc-f4bb-4882-b8bb-4bd8acf03a9d (last visited Jan. 21, 2020); How 
Lyft Works, https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/how-does-lyft-work/ (last visited Jan. 21, 
2020). 
 4. How surge pricing works,  https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/driver-app/how-surge-
works/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2020); How Lyft Works, https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/how-
does-lyft-work/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2020). 
 5. Sasha Lekach, Hey drivers, use this to discover how much Uber and Lyft take from 
you, MASHABLE (Aug. 26, 2019 10:41 AM), https://mashable.com/article/uber-lyft-driver-
earnings-jalopnik-fares/. 
 6. Andrew G. Malik, Note, Worker Classification and the Gig-Economy, 69 RUTGERS 
U. L. REV. 1729, 1747 (2017); see Learn what you need to drive with Lyft, https://www. 
lyft.com/driver-application-requirements (last visited Jan. 21, 2020). 
 7. Lekach, supra note 5. 
 8. Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 99 
(2015). 
 9. Do you want to become an Uber partner-driver? With Uber, you are your own boss, 
https://www.uber.com/en-NL/blog/do-you-want-to-become-an-uber-partner-driver-with-ube 
r-you-are-your-own-boss/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020); Is driving with Lyft right for you? 
https://www.lyft.com/driving-jobs (last visited Jan. 21, 2020). 
 10. Driver Requirements, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/requirements/ (depending 
on the city, some additional requirements may apply) (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
 11. ROSS EISENBREY & LAWRENCE MISHEL, UBER BUSINESS MODEL DOES NOT JUSTIFY 
A NEW “INDEPENDENT WORKER’ CATEGORY, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (2016); Driver Deactivation 
Policy - US ONLY, https://www.uber.com /legal/deactivation-policy/us (last visited Feb. 2, 
2020) 
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full-time or part-time job apart from Uber.12 Similarly, ninety percent of Lyft 
drivers work fewer than twenty hours per week.13  
Uber and Lyft drivers are hired as independent contractors,14 and Uber 
has gone as far as claiming that they are a “technology company” and not a 
“transportation company.”15 In their Guidelines for Third Party Data 
Requests, Uber describes itself as a “technology company that has developed 
an app that connects users (riders) with third party transportation 
providers.”16 In one sense, this characterization can be seen as 
straightforward and reasonable. After all, it could be argued that Uber and 
Lyft merely facilitate a transaction between consumer and supplier, and the 
supplier has a wide degree of discretion concerning their work. However, 
courts have been reluctant to accept this interpretation. In 2015, the 
California Northern District Court rejected Uber’s argument that it was 
merely a “technology company,” pointing to the fact that “Uber does not 
simply sell software; it sells rides.”17 Moreover, Uber gains its revenues from 
customers requesting rides, not on the distribution of its software.18 
Courts have also pushed back against the notion that Uber and Lyft 
driver’s freedom to choose their hours indicates a lack of control by the 
companies, stating that the more relevant inquiry is the degree of control that 
the platform can exercise while drivers are on duty.19 Ultimately, gig 
economy platforms’ unique business model as facilitators between 
consumers and suppliers provides uncertainty when fit into the current 
worker classification framework, an uncertainty that courts have had to 
grapple with since the inception of ride-sharing.20  
 
 12. Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor market For Uber’s 
Driver-Partners in the United States (Princeton Univ., Indus. Relations Section, Working 
Paper No. 587, 2015) (quoting that A December 2014 survey found that, “Uber’s driver-
partners fall into three roughly equal-sized groups: driver-partners who are partnering with 
Uber and have no other job [38 percent], driver-partners who work full-time on another job 
and partner with Uber [31 percent], and driver-partners who have a part-time job apart from 
Uber and partner with Uber [30 percent].”). 
 13. Economic Impact Report 2020, https://www.lyftimpact.com/stats/national (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
 14. Akasha C. Perez, Comment, Addressing an Evolution in America’s Workforce: A 
Call for Negotiated Rulemaking in the Ridesharing Industry, 59 HOW. L.J. 787, 792 (2016). 
 15. O’Connor v. Uber Tech. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 16. Uber Guidelines for Third Party Data Requests and Service of Legal Documents, 
https://www.uber.com/legal/en/document/?name=guidelines-for-third-party-data-requests& 
country=united-states&lang=e (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
 17. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1152. 
 20. Blake E. Stafford, Comment, Riding the Line Between “Employee” and 
“Independent Contractor” in the Modern Sharing Economy, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1223, 
1238 (2016). 
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The 2010s saw a dramatic rise in the popularity of the so-called “gig” 
(or “on-demand”) economy. Similar to the social media explosion of the 
decade before, apps like Uber and Lyft evolved from Silicon Valley start-
ups to industry giants, breathing life into a brand-new sector of the economy. 
Their employees, known as “gig workers” because of their unorthodox and 
somewhat informal relationship with their employer, are in a tenuous 
position regarding their legal classification as workers.  
Employee classifications determine whether workers have access to the 
protections of labor and employment laws, such as minimum wage, the right 
to organize, and unemployment compensation.21 According to the 
Department of Labor, “employee misclassification generates substantial 
losses to the federal government and state governments in the form of lower 
tax revenues, as well as to state unemployment insurance and workers’ 
compensation funds.”22 The high-profile ride-hailing platform Uber 
classifies its workers as “independent contractors” rather than “workers,” 
meaning that they do not have access to such benefits.23 Uber claims that 
workers pick their service because “they love being their own boss,” but 
many employees find that the denial of benefits has relegated them to a much 
lower position.24 In courtrooms across America, legal disputes continue 
between drivers and Uber concerning worker-classifications and their 
resultant benefits.25  
Importantly, this area of jurisprudence affects not only Uber and Lyft 
drivers, but workers directly involved in the tech industry as well. 
Increasingly, computer-based work has been subject to the “crowd-work” or 
“crowd-sourced” model, wherein complicated digital work is broken down 
and distributed to employees piecemeal so that issues can be resolved with 
greater efficiency.26 Like Uber drivers, crowd-sourced employees are 
typically classified as independent contractors, though the scope of their 
employment and their relationship with their employer varies.27 Other lines 
of work will be affected profoundly by worker-classification law as well, 
 
 21. Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy, 
66 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 637 (2017).  
 22. DEPT. OF LAB. WAGE AND HOUR DIV., MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES AS 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa/misclassification 
 23. Alexander M. Tait, Note, Uber Everywhere; But Where is the Driver’s Destination 
in New York?, 36 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 383, 384 - 85 (2019). 
 24. Id. at 384. 
 25. CHERRY & ALOISI, supra note 21, at 646.  
 26. Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951, 956 (2011). 
 27. Malik, supra note 6, at 1751. 
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such as independent truckers and freelance writers.28 Though the primary 
focus of this paper lies with the workers in the on-demand economy, it is 
important to also consider the effects of worker-classifications in crowd-
sourced and other models. 
This paper aims to produce a comparative analysis of worker-
classification employment tests that govern the gig economy by analyzing 
economic, social, legislative, and judicial trends towards recognizing gig 
workers as employees rather than independent contractors and the 
consequent far-reaching implications for both platforms and workers in the 
industry. Furthermore, it will feature both an examination the possibility of 
a third “hybrid” worker classification as well as a study of California’s 
transition from the common law to the ABC test. 
 
FROM “CONTROL” TO ABC: THE RANGE OF TESTS 
 
The “Right to Control” Tests 
Common Law Agency 
 
The Common Law Agency “Right to Control” test finds its origins in 
the Restatement (First) of Agency. The motive for discerning worker status 
in agency law emerged out of the doctrine of respondeat superior.29 In order 
to define when an employer had vicarious liability for the tortious acts of its 
agents, the American Law Institute adopted a test that was reflective of 
common law practices in 1933.30 Section 220 of the Restatement defined a 
servant as “a person employed to perform service for another in his affairs 
and who, with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the 
service, is subject to the other’s control or right to control.”31 This rubric was 
supplemented by a flexible ad hoc multifactor test, ostensibly to guide courts 
in determining the existence of a relationship that is “not capable of exact 
definition.”32 The American Law Institute listed the following factors for 
consideration33: 
 
 28. Don Thompson, Judge stalls California labor law as it relates to truckers, (Dec. 31, 
2019, 7:55 PM), https://www.startribune.com/judge-stalls-california-labor-law-as-it-relates-
to-truckers/566617981/.  
 29. Ryan Vacca, Uncertainty in Employee Status Across Federal Law, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 
121, 125-6 (2019). 
 30. Id. at 126. 
 31. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1933). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise 
over the details of the work; 
 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; 
 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, 
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a 
specialist without supervision; 
 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the 
work; 
 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the 
employer; and 
 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship 
of master and servant.  
 
Not all factors must be met, and no formula exists as to how much 
weight to be given to each factor, or how each factor should be balanced.34 
The most determinant factor, however, came to be the employer’s control 
over the nature and performance of the work.35   
Federally, the common law agency test enjoys wide adherence. With 
some slight variations, the test is used to determine “employee” status in 
ERISA, COBRA, ADA, USERRA, OSHA, NLRA and FLSA claims.36 
Variations of the test are also utilized in a significant minority of states, 
including Texas, New York, and Florida.37  
 
 34. Griffin T. Pivateau, Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees, 
Entrepreneurship, and Empowerment, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 67, 77 (2013). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992). 
 37. Employee or Contractor? The Complete List of Worker Classification Tests By State 
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.wrapbook.com/worker-classification-tests-by-state/. 
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However, the “Right to Control” test has received more than its fair 
share of criticism. Opponents of the test have noted that reliance on the 
control of the employer causes courts to base their opinions on easily 
measured, quantitative factors, resulting in a “mechanistic” and rigid 
analysis of the employment relationship.38 Furthermore, critics argue that the 
test places far too much weight on the formal employment relationship 
structure between an employer and a putative employee, rather than focusing 
on the reality of the arrangement.39 This encourages courts to collapse the 
wide range of possible employment relationships into one convenient 
category: independent contractor.40  
A fundamental issue with determining worker classification based on 
employer control and formal employment relationship structure is that it 
creates an opportunity for employers to contort the terms and conditions of 
employment to restrict employment benefits to workers.41 The test unfairly 
benefits employers by limiting its analysis to only those factors which are 
evaluated from the employer’s perspective, leaving factors relating to the 
worker’s dependence on the employer completely out of the analytical 
framework.42 
Furthermore, the common law agency test is outdated. With modern 
business models such as crowd-sourcing,43 factors such as whether the 
employer provides the “the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work” 
have become meaningless.44 While these factors may have been relevant at 
the time of their inception, the rise in ‘telecommuting’ (working from a 
remote location) has rendered them anachronistic.45  
Finally, there is a fundamental incongruence between the purposes for 
which the common law agency test was created and the purposes of the 
statutes to which it is now applied. Statutes creating employee benefits such 
as workers compensation and Title VII protection contain language that 
evinces a broad, remedial intent to encompass the overwhelming majority of 
the working population.46 In contrast, the common law agency test was 
 
 38. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 83 (1984). 
 39. Id. at 84. 
 40. Id. at 85. 
 41. Id. at 86. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See CHERRY, supra note 26, at 956. 
 44. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220(E) (AM. LAW INST. 1933). 
 45. John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The Future of Independent Contractors and 
Their Status as Non-Employees: Moving on from a Common Law Standard, 14 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 1, 20 (2018). 
 46. See S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 359 
(1989); see Dowd, supra note at 38, at 86. 
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created in order to determine whether the hirer should be held vicariously 
liable for the injuries to third parties caused by a worker.47 In that context, 
the rubric of control is undoubtedly crucial, because the degree of control 
exercised by the hiring entity may justify the imposition of vicarious 
liability.48  
A great deal of legislation for the protection of employees in the 20th-
century adopted the “independent contractor” distinction as an express or 
implied limitation on coverage, and either expressly or impliedly insert the 
common law “Right of Control” test in the statutory definition of 
“employ.”49 However, several state courts have decided that despite an 
express emphasis on “control” as the principle distinction between employee 
and independent contractor, statutes should still be read with a consideration 
of the remedial purposes of the statute.50 In a case interpreting Alaska’s 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Alaskan Supreme Court rejected the test, 
stating that it was “too narrow a criterion for determination of employee 
status in light of the rationale of compensation acts.”51  
 
The NLRA and Federal Statutory Interpretation 
 
Federally, this mismatch in statutory purpose is attributable to both poor 
legislative drafting and Congressional reactionism. Federal cases involving 
the interpretation of New Deal social welfare legislation in the first half of 
the 20th century used statutory purpose as a primary touchstone in their 
analysis.52 In both Hearst and Silk, the Supreme Court was tasked with 
interpreting the term “employee” in both the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”) and the Social Security Act (“SSA”), respectively.53 In both 
cases, the Court was forced to engage in protracted discussion of statutory 
interpretation primarily because of circular, unhelpful statutory definitions.54 
For both the NLRA and the SSA, the Court chose a definition of the term 
 
 47. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1933). 
 48. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 350. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 352-53; See, e.g., Grothe v. Olafson, 659 P.2d 602, 605 (Alaska 1983) (“control 
of details” definition repealed in 1959). 
 51. Searfus v. N. Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966, 969 (Alaska 1970). 
 52. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publs., 322 U.S. 22, 124–9 (1944); United States v. Silk, 
331 U.S. 704, 711–714 (1947). 
 53. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 122; Silk, 331 U.S. at 712. 
 54. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (“definition of 
‘employee’ as ‘any individual employed by an employer,’ 29 U. S. C. § 1002(6), is completely 
circular and explains nothing”); see Silk, 331 U.S. at 711 (“‘Employment’ means ‘any service, 
of whatever nature, performed . . . by an employee for his employer, except . . . agricultural 
labor . . .’”). 
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that reflected the broad, remedial purposes of the statute at issue, pointing 
out that the purported simplicity of a uniform application of the common law 
test was counterproductive.55  
After the decisions in Hearst and Silk, Congress amended the statute to 
clarify that the common law agency test was the proper analytical framework 
for determining the meaning of “employee.”56 Between 1947 and 1949, the 
Republican-led Eightieth Congress took it upon itself to roll back New Deal 
labor and employment protections, seeking to contain union power and 
reprivatize collective bargaining.57 In the House Report detailing Congress’ 
opposition to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “employee” in the 
NLRA in Hearst, the Court was accused of overreliance on the NLRB’s 
purportedly aggressively expansive definition of the term, stating that 
Congress had intended “employee” to be interpreted “according to all 
standard dictionaries,” meaning “someone who works for another for hire.”58  
However, the legislative history of the NLRA, which predates the 
Eightieth Congress, suggests otherwise. During the House Debates before 
the NLRA was passed in 1935, the bill’s sponsor stated, “We are talking 
about all the working people of the country. We say that we want all workers 
to have the right to bargain collectively.”59 The drafters of the bill understood 
that modern business structures had evolved past the need for a simple 
employee-independent contractor distinction, and instead strove for a more 
adaptable test capable of consistent application.60 The House Report stresses 
that even workers with multiple employers or fewer than ten fellow 
employees should be afforded bargaining power, recognizing that, “in some 
industries, such as motion pictures and trucking, employee units of 3, 2, and 
even 1 are not at all uncommon.”61 
Even the opponents of the NLRA at the time of its drafting did not take 
issue with the meaning of “employee” in the bill.62 James Emery, the General 
Counsel of the National Association of Manufacturers, opposed the bill 
during the Senate hearings but implicitly acknowledged that taxi workers 
would benefit as “employees” protected by the NLRA.63 Now, with help 
 
 55. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 122; Silk, 331 U.S. at 712. 
 56. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324-25. 
 57. V.B. Duval, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker 
Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 86 (2017); Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-
Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 779 (1998). 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 18 (1947). 
 59. V.B. Duval, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker 
Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 83 (2017). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 84. 
 63. Id. 
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from the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act, workers across 
the transportation industry, including taxi and FedEx drivers, are 
“independent contractors” under the NLRA.64  
Despite the text of the NLRA and the legislative history indicating a 
resistance against the implementation of a patchwork plan for determining 
workers’ rights to organize and collectively bargain, the pro-business bent of 
the Eightieth Congress effectively precluded the right to organize for 
workers in the transportation industry.65 Now, the omission of a statutory 
definition of “employee” in congressional enactments can be read as 
legislative shorthand for the imposition of the common law agency test.66  
 
The IRS “Right to Control” Test 
 
The IRS common law variation of the “right to control” test, adopted in 
1987, originally included twenty factors culled from examinations and 
rulings.67 Worker classification is important to the IRS because an 
independent contractor’s earnings are subject to a self-employment tax, 
whereas an employer must withhold income taxes and pay Social Security, 
Medicare taxes and unemployment tax on wages paid to an employee.68 In 
2004, because of the difficulty of applying the abundance of factors and their 
waning relevance due to changes in business practices, the IRS opted for a 
modernized and more organized formulation.69 Instead of twenty free-
floating factors, the test now groups evidence into three categories: 
behavioral control, financial control, and relationship of the parties.70 
Though the categories simplify the test, each of the three categories contains 
several subfactors for courts to consider, leaving a total of thirteen possible 
factors for the court to analyze.71  
 
 64. Id. at 90. 
 65. Id. at 86. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 123. 
 66. See, e. g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-740 
(1989) (“[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the 
common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to 
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.” (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 
U.S. 322, 329 (1981))). 
 67. I.R.S., Information Letter No. INFO 2004-0087 (Apr. 8, 2004), https://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-wd/04-0087.pdf. 
 68. I.R.S., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE VS. CONTRACTOR DESIGNATION, https://www.irs. 
gov/newsroom/understanding-employee-vs-contractor-designation. 
 69. Supra note 67. 
 70. Id. 
 71. I.R.S., BEHAVIORAL CONTROL, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-sel 
f-employed/behavioral-control, (“When and where to do the work, what tools or equipment 
to use, what workers to hire or to assist with the work, where to purchase supplies and services, 
what work must be performed by a specified individual, what order or sequence to follow 
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The behavioral control category refers to facts that show whether the 
employer has a right to control or direct the work in which the worker is 
engaged.72 The IRS is careful to point out that the business does not have to 
exercise control over the way the work is done, it need only have the right to 
exercise that control.73 The financial control category concerns whether the 
employer has a right to direct or control the financial and business aspects of 
the worker’s job, including the employer’s investment in equipment, 
unreimbursed expenses, and the method of payment.74 Finally, the type of 
relationship factor depends on both the business and worker’s perception of 
their relationship: the existence of employee-type benefits, the permanency 
of the relationship, and whether the services provided are a key activity of 
the business.75  
Unlike the ABC test, which in some states requires that freedom from 
control be contractually demonstrated,76 the IRS test focuses on the material 
facts and circumstances of the worker relationship itself and deemphasizes 
“the designation or description of the relationship by the parties.”77 For the 
type of relationship factor, the IRS clarifies that a written contract describing 
the relationship between the parties is relevant evidence, but a designation 
of independent contractor or employee status in a written contract is 







when performing the work”); I.R.S., FINANCIAL CONTROL, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/ 
small-businesses-self-employed/financial-control, (“Significant investment in the equipment, 
unreimbursed expenses, opportunity for profit or loss is often an indicator of an independent 
contractor, services available to the market, method of payment”); I.R.S., TYPE OF 
RELATIONSHIP, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/type-of-rela 
tionship, (“Written contracts, employee benefits, permanency of the relationship, services 
provided as key activity of the business”). 
 72. I.R.S., BEHAVIORAL CONTROL, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-
self-employed/behavioral-control. 
 73. Id. 
 74. I.R.S., FINANCIAL CONTROL, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/financial-control. 
 75. I.R.S., TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-
self-employed/type-of-relationship. 
 76. Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An 
Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 53, 68 (2015). 
 77. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. 
 78. I.R.S., supra note 75. 
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The ABC Test 
 
A common formulation of the three-factor ABC test requires an 
employer to prove that the worker is: A) free from the control and direction 
of the employer, B) performs work that is outside the hirer’s usual business, 
and C) customarily engages in a separate and independent business or 
trade.79 Failing any one of the three factors means that the worker should be 
classified as an employee and the employer, depending on the jurisdiction, 
would be required to pay the state minimum wage, payroll taxes, worker’s 
compensation, disability, overtime and paid leave.80 Variations of the ABC 
test are present in more than thirty-eight states, most notably California, 
Massachusetts, and New Jersey.81 Most states limit the test’s application to 
specific areas, such as worker’s compensation or unemployment 
compensation.82  
Notably, the ABC test has the novel function of placing the onus on the 
employer to prove that an independent contractor relationship exists. The 
universal presumption against employers (which is part of the ABC 
formulation in all but two states that adhere to the test)83 provides more 
structure to the test in the sense that it requires an employer to prove the 
legitimacy of the employment relationship in both typical and atypical 
business structures.84 With the ABC test, courts no longer need to tailor their 
analysis to well-established business structures and can rely on the 
employer’s justification for the worker’s status.85 This has the additional 
beneficial effect of overreaching unconventional business structures that 
may have been created for the purpose of circumventing the law.86 
Finally, an across-the-board implementation of the ABC test would 
provide great advantages for states. Many states have a patchwork of 
separate tests for worker classification in different statutory areas, such as 
those governing claims and benefits, taxes, unemployment insurance, or 
workers compensation.87 Though this would require a federal acceptance of 
the ABC test, a uniform application of the ABC tests across all statutory 
 
 79. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Gig-Dependence: Finding the Real Independent 
Contractors of Platform Work, 39 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 379, 409 (2019). 
 80. Rich Ehisen, California Bill Highlights Worker Misclassification Debate, LAW360: 
ST. NET CAP. J. (June 28, 2019, 5:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1174238/cali 
fornia-bill-highlights-worker-misclassification-debate. 
 81. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 27. 
 82. Ehisen, supra note 80. 
 83. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 76, at 71. 
 84. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 27. 
 85. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 76, at 71. 
 86. Id. at 72. 
 87. Id. at 73. 
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areas would simplify compliance for employers.88 The shift to systematic 
implementation of the ABC test represents not only a shift to a more 
simplified and fairer test, but also a unified and consistent standard across all 
relevant law.  
However, the ABC test has been criticized for merely hiding the “right 
to control” factors that it displaces.89 In New Jersey, the state’s supreme court 
interpreted factor A, “free from control or direction over the performance of 
such service,” as incorporating several of the factors from the IRS’s twenty-
factor “right to control” test.90 Thus, prong A of the ABC test can entail some 
of the same uncertainties and ambiguities as the common law formulation.91 
Without the guidance of multifactor tests for control, the ABC test has been 
criticized for sacrificing flexibility for clarity and uniformity. The binary, 
all-or-nothing approach that the test presents can be problematic when an 
employer fails to meet all three requirements, despite overwhelming 
evidence that the worker is an independent contractor rather than an 
employee.92 Ultimately, these critiques boil down to the tension between the 
worker-employer relationship, which necessarily exists on a spectrum, and 
the binary determinations of a court implementing the ABC test.93  
 
PENALTIES AS A MECHANISM FOR COMPLIANCE 
 
ABC tests often include strict enforcement measures to disincentivize 
worker misclassification.94 Under the common law scheme, a misclassifying 
business is penalized with back taxes, back pay, and benefits that merely 
place the business in the same position they would have been if they had 
properly classified the worker.95 In contrast, states utilizing the ABC test 
have enforced harsher punitive measures such as fines and potential criminal 
liability.96 Seven states have implemented increased penalties for any 
 
 88. PEARCE & SILVA, note 45, at 29. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t. of Labor, 125 N.J. 567, 590 (1991). 
 91. Edward Zelinsky, Complexity Is The Cost Of Calif.’s Worker Classification Law, 
LAW360: ST. NET CAP. J. (Oct. 24, 2019, 5:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
1212504/print?section=california. 
 92. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 29-30. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 28-29. 
 95. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 76, at 75 (quoting Christopher Buscaglia, 
Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 121 (2009).  
 96. Id. at 75, 77. 
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business that violates the statute and eight states have implemented civil 
penalties for businesses that intentionally violate the statute.97  
Ten states have implemented criminal liability for intentional 
misclassification.98 Criminal liability could be an effective tool for state 
governments to penalize large-scale offenders with off-the-book workforces 
and insolvency to protect them from back taxes or fines.99 In New Mexico 
and New York, violation of the statute is a misdemeanor subject to 
prosecution by the state attorney general.100 Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Illinois, and Utah have subjected violating businesses to low-level 
felonies.101 Massachusetts and New York allow for fines up to $50,000 for 
intentional violations, though New York had only prosecuted six cases 
through 2010.102 Nevertheless, the added enforcement measures provide 
greater discouragement for intentional misclassification. 
 
BRIGHT-LINE VS. MULTIFACTOR 
 
The central point of tension between the variations of the common law 
“right to control” tests and the ABC test is the difference in the number of 
factors courts must assess. The simple three-pronged approach of the ABC 
test clarifies the law and instructs employers in how to comply.103 A lower 
number of applicable factors prevents courts from selectively ignoring some 
factors in favor of others.104 Furthermore, the reduction in factors eliminates 
the most easily manipulated factors, such as intent or location, used by 
employers seeking to circumvent worker-classification standards.105 By 
dividing their workforce into categories and varying the working conditions 
of each group according to the multifactor test, a business could contort the 
employment relationship and force its workers into the independent 
contractor classification.106 Each of the ABC test’s criteria are dispositive, 
forcing courts to focus on the factors presented, rather than whatever factors 
appear pertinent to the case at hand.107  
 
 97. Id. at 75. 
 98. Id. at 77. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the 
Modern Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 341, 367 (2016). 
 104. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 28; see Pinsof, supra note 103, at 368. 
 105. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 28. 
 106. Dynamex Operations West, INC. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 4 
Cal. 5th 903, 955 (2018). 
 107. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 28. 
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Without guidance on how to weigh the abundance of factors in the 
multifactor tests, judges are left with broad discretion to conduct their 
analysis, creating room for an unsound degree of subjectivity.108 This has the 
compound effect of lessening predictability for businesses and workers.109 
The unpredictability of multifactor tests is illustrated in a pair of factually 
similar cases involving FedEx delivery drivers. In FedEx Home Delivery v. 
NLRB, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
placed heavy emphasis on the drivers’ “entrepreneurial opportunity for gain 
or loss” as a primary touchstone in their analysis.110 Focusing on the drivers’ 
ability to choose their own hours and breaks, what routes they follow, and 
the fact that contractors could contract multiple routes and hire, compensate, 
and dismiss their own workers, the court found that the FedEx drivers were 
independent contractors.111  
In Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered and ultimately rejected the 
D.C. Court’s “entrepreneurial opportunity” rationale.112 Despite using the 
same common law agency factors,113 the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
“entrepreneurial opportunities do not undermine a finding of employee 
status.”114 Instead, the court emphasized FedEx’s “great deal of control” over 
the worker’s operations, including its control of the appearance of workers 
and their vehicles, the assignment of specific service areas, and the 
requirement that drivers work 9.5-11 hours a day, holding that the FedEx 
drivers were employees.115 This example demonstrates the varying and 
unpredictable results that can arise from use of the same multifactor tests. 
 
“HYBRID” WORK CLASSIFICATIONS: A THIRD CATEGORY? 
 
Some commentators have proposed a “hybrid” work classification 
category to supplement the independent contractor-worker dichotomy. In a 
report sponsored by the Hamilton project, former Deputy Secretary of Labor 
Seth Harris and Princeton economist, Alan Krueger advocate for a hybrid 
“independent worker” category as a default classification for gig workers.116 
Under this “independent worker” category, workers would be afforded civil 
 
 108. Id. at 17. 
 109. Id. at 18. 
 110. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 385 F.3d 492, 503 (2009). 
 111. Id. at 499. 
 112. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 993 (2014). 
 113. See id. at 989.; see also FedEx Home Delivery, 385 F.3d at 506. 
 114. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 987. 
 115. Id. at 990. 
 116. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS 
FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 2 (2015). 
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rights protections, tax withholding, employer contributions for payroll taxes, 
worker’s compensation, the right to organize and bargain collectively under 
the National Labor Relations Act,117 and the antidiscrimination protections 
of Title VII,118 but excluded from unemployment insurance benefits and 
hours-based benefits such as overtime and minimum wage.119 One of the 
foremost principles that guides their recommendation is the 
“immeasurability of work hours” for gig workers.120 The difficulty with 
measuring work hours for Uber and Lyft drivers, Harris and Krueger argue, 
emerges from the ambiguity of time spent waiting between rides.121 Drivers 
could be spending that time working for another gig platform or for personal 
use, making accurate work hour measurement impossible.122  
In a report for the Economic Policy Institute, Ross Eisenbrey and 
Lawrence Mishel push back against this contention, arguing it downplays 
the role that big data plays in the gig economy.123 Uber and Lyft both 
routinely track driver work hours when they present information to the 
public, basing their measurements on the amount of time the app was turned 
on.124 Uber assumes that drivers are “active” when their app is turned on, 
monitoring acceptance rates and dismissing drivers who do not maintain a 
sufficient acceptance rate.125 Moreover, a ride request that is not accepted 
within 15 seconds is treated as refused, meaning that Harris and Krueger’s 
claim that a driver could engage in personal work or work for another 
platform rests on shaky ground.126  
Still, proponents argue that third category would be an apt adjustment 
to the rapidly changing digital marketplace.127 This hybrid work 
classification would fit the needs of workers in an increasingly casual work 
economy without placing an undue burden on their employers.128 By 
automatically sorting gig workers into a hybrid “dependent contractors” 
category, the uncertainty surrounding worker classification in the gig 
economy would be eliminated.129 This would resolve litigation across the 
 
 117. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012). 
 118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964); HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 116, at 17-18. 
 119. HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 116, at 2. 
 120. Id. at 13. 
 121. Id. at 2. 
 122. Id. 
 123. EISENBREY & MISHEL, supra note 11. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. CHERRY & ALOISI, supra note 21, at 646. 
 128. Id. at 647. 
 129. Id.  
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board, freeing up the resources of both the judicial system and on-demand 
platforms.130  
However, the creation of a “hybrid” worker classification for workers 
in the gig economy would necessitate a distinction between the worker rights 
that are included or excluded under that category. Excluding gig workers 
from minimum compensation protections would likely alienate the drivers 
that are already struggling with low pay.131 Furthermore, the creation of a 
third category makes predictability difficult for workers and employers, as 
the third category introduces yet another uncertainty to a formerly binary 
system that was already complicated enough. When applied, it often makes 
for another intricate test courts and employers must grapple with.132  
Beyond the issue of benefits, legislative creation of a hybrid worker 
classification category, as a practical matter, would be an incredible feat.  
Debates over which rights to include under the category would likely be 
hotly contested, and given that the law typically lags behind technological 
advances, the resultant legislation may quickly become outdated.133 The 
likelihood of judges creating such a category by way of judicial carveout is 
slim, due to the way in which the statutes are written, and would require 
extreme judicial activism.134 With the abundance and complexity of these 
issues, it seems unlikely that the hybrid worker classification category will 




California, with numerous metropolitan hubs, is a boon for the on-
demand economy. Uber’s net impact on California is $390 million annually 
and Uber rider benefits have been calculated to save $3.9 billion annually in 
“amenity benefits” (“including improved comfort, safety, 
weather protection, time and cost certainty/reliability, and flexibility of 
schedule and destination choice”) and cost and time savings.135 However, 
Uber’s ubiquitous presence and low barriers to entry have had a devastating 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Annie Nova, Uber drivers block traffic in Manhattan, protesting low pay and 
poor working conditions, CNBC: PERS. FIN. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/ 
09/17/uber-drivers-are-protesting-again-heres-what-the-job-is-really-like.html. 
 132. See CHERRY & ALOISI, supra note 21, at 660, (“Lavoratore parasubordinato” test). 
 133. See STEPHEN MERGENTHALER & KATHERINE GARRETT-COX, WORLD ECON. FORUM, 
VALUES AND THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: CONNECTING THE DOTS BETWEEN 
VALUE, VALUES, PROFIT AND PURPOSE 6 (2016) (“Given the Fourth Industrial Revolution’s 
extraordinarily fast technological and social change, relying only on government legislation 
and incentives to ensure the right outcomes is ill advised.”). 
 134. CHERRY & ALOISI, supra note 21, at 681. 
 135. ECON. DEV. RESEARCH GROUP, UBER’S ECONOMIC IMPACT IN CALIFORNIA (2016). 
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impact on the taxi industry in California, causing the value of taxi medallions 
in San Francisco to plummet.136 Furthermore, Uber and Lyft driver’s 
classification as independent contractor allows the companies to avoid 
certain payroll taxes, insurance, and administrative expenses.137 With the 
passage Assembly Bill 5 (“AB5”), Uber and other gig economy platforms 
are at the center of public debate on worker classification in the state, with 
arguments raging over whether the impact of the legislation will be a net 
harm or a net good. However, before delving into the nuts and bolts of AB5, 
it is important to review the recent history of worker-classification law in the 
state in order to better understand the evolution of worker-classification law 
in California. As a state that has moved from the common law agency test to 
the ABC test, California may be an instructive example for other states to do 
the same. 
In 1989, the Supreme Court of California decided a landmark worker-
classification case concerning the workers’ compensation coverage of 
seasonal workers. In Borello, the workers contracted with the growers in a 
“sharefarmer” agreement, wherein the workers were to manage their own 
labor, share the profit or loss from the crop yield, and agreed in writing that 
they were not employees.138 The California Workers’ Compensation Act 
mandated the use of the common-law “control-of-work” (“control”) test to 
determine if a worker was an “employee” as defined by the statute: “whether 
the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner 
and means of accomplishing the result desired.”139  
Aware of the dangers of a rigid and isolated application of the “control” 
factor alone, the California Supreme Court decided to follow previous 
decisions that supplemented the test with additional factors adopted from the 
Second Restatement of Agency “Right to Control” Test.140 The court 
followed common law rulings that recognized the right to discharge at will, 
without cause creates a strong evidence in support of an employment 
relationship.  
However, finding that the common law and statutory differences 
between “independent contractors” and “employees” were substantial (the 
common law test was designed to define an employer’s liability for injuries 
caused by his employee), the California Supreme Court was justified in 
 
 136. Ida Mojadad, Who’s Killing the Taxi Industry? (June 13, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.sfweekly.com/news/whos-killing-the-taxi-industry/. 
 137. Perez, supra note 14, at 796. 
 138. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 345 
(1989). 
 139. Id. at 350. 
 140. Id. at 351. 
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making a slight departure from common law principles.141 The tension 
between common law and statutory purpose prompted the court to follow the 
path laid out by other states in worker-classification cases by considering the 
remedial statutory purpose of the statute.142 The court then identified four 
primary purposes of the California Workers’ Compensation Act: “(1) to 
ensure that the cost of industrial injuries will be part of the cost of goods 
rather than a burden on society, (2) to guarantee prompt, limited 
compensation for an employee’s work injuries, regardless of fault, as an 
inevitable cost of production, (3) to spur increased industrial safety, and (4) 
in return, to insulate the employer from tort liability for his employees’ 
injuries.”143 Unrestrained by federal Congressional resistance to a more 
liberal definition of “employee”, the court concluded that the Act intended 
comprehensive coverage of injuries in employment and set out to perform 
its analysis.144 
However, after diagnosing the fundamental purposes of the statute, the 
Supreme Court of California clarified that it was not adopting “detailed new 
standards for examination of the issue.”145 Concluding that it was permissible 
to utilize the factors set out in previous cases while according deference to 
the Act’s purposes, the court found that growers had failed to meet their 
burden of proving that the workers were “independent contractors.”146 
Already, deference to statutory purpose in the “control” test evinced a 
progressive trend towards granting “employee” classification to workers 
performing simple labor. By formulating the “control” test in a way that was 
reflective of legislative intent, Borello effectuated a worker-classification 
scheme that was aligned with the progressive interests of Californians. After 
Dynamex, it was clear that this trend was not an aberration.  
Dynamex, decided 29 years after Borello, represents a significant shift 
in the landscape of worker-classification law in California and a further 
embracement of a progressive attitude towards the granting of “employee” 
status. Dynamex concerned a same-day courier and delivery service that 
converted all of its delivery drivers to independent contractors, requiring the 
drivers to pay for their own vehicles and transportation expenses, including 
tolls, vehicle maintenance, fuel, and vehicle liability insurance, as well as all 
taxes and workers’ compensation insurance.147 Two drivers sued, alleging 
 
 141. Id. at 352. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 354. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 360.  
 147. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 4 Cal. 5th 
903, 917 (2018). 
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that they were misclassified as independent contractors and that as a result, 
Dynamex was violating the provisions of an Industrial Welfare Commission 
wage order governing the transportation industry.148  
The Supreme Court of California held that the “suffer or permit to 
work” definition of “employ” in the wage order is the proper rubric for 
evaluating whether a worker is an independent contractor or employee for 
purposes of the obligations set forth in the wage order, but diverged from the 
multi-factor test from Borello and the decisions before it.149 Launching into 
a lengthy summary of pre-Borello worker-classification cases and Borello 
itself, the court characterizes Borello not as a case exemplifying the common 
law standard for distinguishing employees from independent contractors, but 
as a case that resolves such issues by looking to the purpose and scope of the 
particular statute.150  
With the Borello emphasis on statutory purpose in mind, the court set 
out to distill the primary objectives of the Industrial Welfare Commission’s 
wage orders, finding that the wage orders were adopted to protect worker 
health and safety and ensure that workers are afforded a level of wages and 
working conditions that allow them to obtain at least a subsistence standard 
of living.151 The legislature found these measures necessary due to the 
unequal bargaining power between hiring businesses and individual workers 
and the likelihood that workers would accept substandard wages and 
working conditions.152 
The wage orders also serve the dual purpose of guaranteeing that law-
abiding businesses will not be hurt by unfair competition from businesses 
that provide substandard wages and working conditions for their 
employees.153 Recognizing that the remedial purposes of the wage order 
would not be achieved without a scope that would be broad enough to 
eliminate inadequate wages and working conditions, the court concluded that 
the suffer or permit to work standard must be interpreted broadly to include 
as “employees” any worker that can reasonably be viewed as working in the 
hiring entity’s business.154  
The court notes that federal courts have recognized that the standard 
should be broader and more inclusive than the preexisting common law test 
for worker-classifications when interpreting the suffer or permit to work 
 
 148. Id. at 914. 
 149. Id. at 916. 
 150. Id. at 934. 
 151. Id. at 952. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 953. 
5 - NOTE_THORDARSON_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2020  9:15 AM 
Winter 2021] AB-5 AND DRIVE 157 
standard set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act.155 The court then 
undertakes an evaluation of the existing common law standards for 
distinguishing “employee” from “independent contractor,” acknowledging 
that there are advantages to the multifactor, totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach that Borello and other common law tests have utilized.156 However, 
the flexibility of the multifactor test presents significant problems (most of 
which have been addressed under the “Bright-Line vs. Multifactor” 
heading), especially in the wage and hour context.157  
Finally, the court points out that California’s adoption of the suffer or 
permit to work standard predates the FLSA, meaning that California’s IWC 
never intended to adopt the economic reality test that federal agencies use.158 
In fact, prior decisions in California had expressly declined to use that test, 
noting that California wage orders are intended to provide broader protection 
than those under the federal standard.159 
Importantly, this issue presents a significant judicial roadblock for other 
states that included the suffer or permit to work standard after the enactment 
of the FLSA and had been interpreted to incorporate the economic reality 
test.160 After launching into a discussion of the various benefits of the ABC 
test, the California Supreme Court concluded that the ABC test is most 
consistent with the history and purpose of the suffer or permit to work 
standard in California’s wage orders.161  
California’s path from the common law agency test to the ABC test 
essentially boils down to the embracement of statutory purpose. This path 
was paved with deference to the intended reach of the remedial purposes of 
the California Worker’s Compensation Act and the Industrial Welfare 
Commission’s wage orders in Borello and Dynamex respectively, first by 
formulating the common law test in a way that reflected legislative intent, 
and then replacing it with the ABC test when it was clear that the common 
law test could not comport with the purpose of the statute at issue. As pointed 
out in Dynamex, other states who have adopted their definition of 
“employee” from any of the myriad of federal labor protection laws may find 
it difficult to change their test with the governing federal common law 
standard looming over them.162 Altogether, those states may be forced to 
 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 954. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 956. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 956-7. 
 162. See id. at 956 (“Unlike a number of our sister states that included the suffer or permit 
to work standard in their wage and hour laws or regulations after the FLSA had been enacted 
and had been interpreted to incorporate the economic reality test, California’s adoption of the 
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confront this issue by legislative amendment. Whether or not the ABC test 
is incorporated federally, the road from the common law to the ABC test 
necessitates an embracement of statutory purpose. 
 
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 5 
 
California’s Assembly Bill 5 provides that for the purposes of the 
provisions of the Labor Code, the Unemployment Insurance Code, and the 
wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission, a worker is considered 
an employee rather than an independent contractor unless the employer 
meets the three dictates of the ABC test: (A) The person is free from the 
control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance 
of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in 
fact; (B) The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the 
hiring entity’s business; (C) The person is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature 
as that involved in the work performed.163 If they do not, those workers are 
entitled to benefits (unemployment insurance, work injury compensation, 
break time, paid sick leave, and minimum wage) and the right to unionize.164 
The law is estimated to cover more than half of the independent contractors 
in California, but reclassification is not automatic.165 Instead, independent 
contractors must challenge their classification by filing lawsuits or 
complaints with the appropriate government agency.166 The law also 
empowers city attorneys to pursue lawsuits against noncompliant 
businesses.167  
The law does not provide an employee presumption for everyone. 
Workers in certain specified areas are exempted from coverage, and a vast 
majority of them are subject to the Borello test rather than the ABC test if 
the applicable criteria are met.168 For instance, certain medical professionals 
(physicians, surgeons, dentists, podiatrists, psychologists, or veterinarians 
licensed by the State of California) performing medical services for a health 
 
suffer or permit to work standard predated the enactment of the FLSA. Thus, as a matter of 
legislative intent, the IWC’s adoption of the suffer or permit to work standard in California 
wage orders was not intended to embrace the federal economic reality test.”) 
 163. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(a)(1) (repealed Sept. 2020). 
 164. James S. Azadian, 2020: New Year, New Decade, and New Laws, 62 No. 3 ORANGE 
COUNTY LAWYER 46, 46 (2020). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 46-7; see EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP’T, HELP US FIGHT FRAUD, https://www. 
edd.ca.gov/payroll_taxes/Help_Fight_Fraud.htm. 
 167. Azadian, supra note 164, at 46-7. 
 168. Bruce Sarchet et al., The Potential Effects of Calif. Contractor Reclassification Bill, 
LAW 360 (2019). 
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care entity are subject to the Borello test.169 Outside of these occupational 
exemptions, workers providing “professional services” (marketing 
professionals, human resources administrators, graphic designers, grant 
writers, fine artists, travel agents, freelance writers, IRS tax professionals, 
esthetician, electrologist, barbers and cosmetologists, freelance 
photographers, and payment processing agents) are also subject to the 
Borello test,170 provided that the hiring entity proves the existence of six 
factors.171 The rationale behind this exemption is to allow a contracting 
business to receive services from a worker employed by another business, 
with the contract between the contracting business and the professional 
service provider being governed by the Borello test.172  
There are similar exemptions that apply the Borello test for real estate 
licensees and repossession agencies;173 work performed by a business entity 
formed as a sole proprietor, partnership, LLC, or corporation for a 
contracting business;174 subcontractors in the construction industry;175 
relationships between referral agencies and service providers;176 and 
individuals performing services with a licensed “motor club.”177 These 
exemptions signify an attempt on the part of the legislature to address the 
rigidity of the ABC test in situations where it would create major inequities 
or cause undue economic turmoil. 
Companies that rely on gig workers would like an exemption as well. 
On December 30, 2019, Uber and its gig economy affiliate, Postmates, filed 
 
 169. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(B)(2) (repealed Sept. 2020). 
 170. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(c)(2) (repealed Sept. 2020), (Note: additional restrictions 
may apply). 
 171. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(c)(1) (repealed Sept. 2020), (“(A) The individual 
maintains a business location, which may include the individual’s residence, that is separate 
from the hiring entity. Nothing in this subdivision prohibits an individual from choosing to 
perform services at the location of the hiring entity. (B) If work is performed more than six 
months after the effective date of this section, the individual has a business license, in addition 
to any required professional licenses or permits for the individual to practice in their 
profession. (C) The individual has the ability to set or negotiate their own rates for the services 
performed. (D) Outside of project completion dates and reasonable business hours, the 
individual has the ability to set the individual’s own hours. (E) The individual is customarily 
engaged in the same type of work performed under contract with another hiring entity or holds 
themselves out to other potential customers as available to perform the same type of work. 
(F) The individual customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment 
in the performance of the services.”) 
 172. Sarchet, supra note 168. 
 173. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(d) (repealed Sept. 2020). 
 174. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(e) (repealed Sept. 2020). 
 175. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(f) (repealed Sept. 2020) (Note: additional restrictions 
apply). 
 176. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(g) (repealed Sept. 2020). 
 177. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(h) (repealed Sept. 2020). 
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a lawsuit against the state of California, aiming to have AB5 declared invalid 
or to exempt them from coverage.178 The lawsuit, filed two days before AB5 
was set to take effect, alleges that the law is unconstitutional and unfairly 
targets gig economy companies and their workers.179 More specifically, Uber 
said in a statement that it brought the challenge “on the basis of lack of equal 
protection and due process under both federal and state law.”180 Judge Dolly 
M. Gee, presiding over the District Court for the Central District of 
California, refused to grant an preliminary injunction, noting that though 
Uber and Postmates had shown some measure of irreparable harm, public 
interest and the balance of equities weighed in favor of California enforcing 
the legislation.181 Uber made a statement declaring that it is reviewing the 
decision and deciding whether or not it will pursue an appeal.182  
Uber isn’t alone in its criticism of AB5. In the months preceding the 
enactment of the law and in its immediate wake, AB5 was the recipient of 
harsh criticism from various legal scholars and commentators. Larry Buhl, 
writing for the Business Insider, points out that hiring businesses in 
California may start to outsource some of their labor to neighboring states.183 
A media company has already placed an ad looking for out-of-state 
journalists to cover stories about California.184 Another article warns future 
retirees not to rely on gig work or a contractual relationship with a former 
employer as supplemental income, as companies may not want to provide 
benefits for employees that are not full time.185 Others share concern that 
small businesses, rather than tech giants like Uber, will feel the brunt of the 
law.186  
In response to the uncertainty that AB5 has spawned, citizens and 
lawmakers are desperately searching for ways to address the myriad of issues 
that have come forward in AB5’s wake. Two months after the bill took 
effect, 34 pieces of legislation were introduced to the California legislature, 
 
 178. Dara Kerr, Uber’s Last-Minute Bid to Beat Gig Worker Law is Latest of Many Tries, 
CNET (Jan. 1, 2020). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Noam Schreiber, Uber and Postmates File Suit to Block California Freelancer Law, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2019. 
 181. Olson v. California, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34710, 34746 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020). 
 182. Jim Wilson, Judge Refuses to Block California’s Gig Worker Law During Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020). 
 183. Larry Buhl, California is Attempting a Massive Labor Experiment that Could Grow 
into a Disaster for Millions of Workers, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2019). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Chris Carosa, Will California’s AB5 Law Gag Your Gig Retirement?, FORBES (Feb. 
27, 2020). 
 186. See Bruce Willey, Why Entrepreneurs Should Be More Worried About Uber Than 
AB5, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 6, 2020). 
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most of which aiming at expanding the list of exempted occupations under 
the law.187 A federal judge has already granted a preliminary injunction to 
prevent AB5 from applying to independent truckers in the state.188  
Unwilling to accept the massive financial losses that AB5 could entail, 
Uber has launched its “Project Luigi,” a semi-clandestine scheme to build 
Uber’s claim that drivers are sufficiently free and independent, and thus are 
independent contractors under AB5.189 Some of these features (which are 
only available to California drivers) have already been unveiled, such as the 
ability to see estimated fares upfront, decline trips upfront based on 
inadequacy of fares without penalty, and the addition of a “favorite” option, 
which would allow a rider to prioritize chosen drivers and establish a direct 
link between them, allowing the driver a “first pass” to accept a scheduled 
trip.190 By shifting its business model within the jurisdiction, the changes 
seek to provide drivers with more autonomy and a more direct relationship 
with their clients, thereby strengthening its claim that drivers are more like 
independent contractors than they are employees. Although this may satisfy 
prong A of the ABC test (free from the control and direction of the 
employer), Uber may have difficulties proving prongs B and C, unless it can 
convince a court that it is a software company rather than a ride-provider, 




It is difficult to predict how AB5 will impact gig workers and the 
companies they work for in California. In a brief three-month period, the law 
has been the subject of heated debate, countless proposed amendments, and 
a high-profile lawsuit. If Uber’s “Project Luigi” fails and it chooses not to 
pursue an appeal on its failed preliminary injunction, stock prices will fall 
and the company will take a financial hit, but the international tech giant will 
likely survive. The success of AB5’s implementation will have a rippling 
effect on other states such as New Jersey, whose Senate bill 4204, which 
mimics AB5, is the subject of much debate in the state.192  
 
 187. John Myers, A Flood of Proposed Changes to California’s AB 5 Awaits State 
Lawmakers, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2020). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Faiz Sidduiqi, Uber’s Secret Project to Bolster Its Case Against AB5, California’s 
Gig-Worker Law, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2020). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 192. Terrence T. MacDonald, Debate to Continue over NJ Bill Rewriting Rules for 
Freelance Workers, Contractors, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Dec. 18, 2019). 
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The creation of a third “intermediate” worker classification, while 
innovative, may bring more complications than it does solutions because it 
would undermine predictability for businesses and introduce yet another test 
for employers and courts to interpret. Furthermore, the legislative effort 
required to create a third category of worker classifications could prove to 
be insurmountable. 
Despite its rigidity, the worker-friendly ABC test best effectuates the 
intent of Congress when it enacted broad, remedial New Deal labor 
protections almost a century ago. California’s focus on statutory purpose 
when it adopted the ABC test in Dynamex may be instructive to other states, 
but without an incorporation of the ABC test at the federal level, some state 
judicial systems may be hamstrung in making this change, as their state labor 
protections were enacted after the passage of the Congressional legislation.  
 
